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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
there is an adequate remedy at law. However, the extreme brevity
of the opinion inhibits a clear understanding of the rationale. The
Court mentions that a contract to sell land is specifically enforceable
"though the defendant's sole obligation is to pay money." If this
allusion was intended to justify the decision on the ground that a
construction loan agreement is analogous to a contract to sell land,
then perhaps the decision may be regarded, not as a startling de-
parture from precedent, but as adopting the view taken in the
Columbus case.
A
INSURANCE - STATUTE OF FRAUDS No DEFENSE TO PARTY
FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINING POLICY FROM ORAL AsSIGNEE.-The
insured's widow claimed the proceeds of a life policy in which her
sister-in-law, the defendant, was noted as beneficiary. The plaintiff-
widow asserted that her deceased husband orally assigned and de-
livered the policy to her, at which time she was the named beneficiary,
and that she thereafter made substantially all premium payments.
She further alleged that the decedent secretly removed the policy from
her possession, changed the beneficiary, and gave it to the defendant
with whom he had conspired. The defendant contended that the
oral assignment was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The
Court held that the plaintiff would be entitled to the proceeds of the
policy if the allegations were proven. Katzman v. -,ta Life Ins.
Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d 307 (1955).
An insurance policy is a chose in action.1 Before the enactment
of Section 31, subdivision 9, of the Personal Property Law,2 it was
well settled in New York that a policy was orally assignable.3 In
most other jurisdictions such an assignment is still recognized.4 For
I Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 158 N.Y. 24, 52 N.E. 662 (1899); Matter of
Pastore, 155 Misc. 247, 279 N.Y. Supp. 200 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
2 "Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note
or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or
undertaking;
"9. Is a contract to assign or an assignment, with or without considera-
tion to the promisor, of a life or health or accident insurance policy, or a
promise, with or without consideration to the promisor, to name a beneficiary
of any such policy. This provision shall not apply to a policy of industrial
life or health or accident insurance." N.Y. PEns. Psop. LAW § 31(9) (effective
March 11, 1943).
3 Marcus v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 68 N.Y. 625 (1877); McGlynn
v. Curry, 82 App. Div. 431, 81 N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1903).
4 See Loth, Gifts of Life Insurance, [1945] INs. L.J. 515, 517; 25 Miss. L.J.
72 (1953). Contra, Steele v. Gatlin, 115 Ga. 929, 42 S.E. 253 (1902).
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an effective assignment prior to the enactment of subdivision 9, de-
livery was virtually essential. Almost all the policy assignments
claimed were gifts,6 and delivery is necessary for a valid gift.6 Though
an attempted assignment for consideration also failed in a case where
there was no delivery,7 it seems that evidence of comparable weight
would have been sufficient to establish such an assignment.8
Possession under claim of delivery is ambiguous, however, since
a policy must fall into the possession of another at the time of the
insured's death.9 As a corollary, the person best able to refute a
claim of oral assignment is unable to defend.' 0 That such a situation
was an invitation to fraud is evidenced by the large number of actions
which were brought based on oral assignment."' The final impetus
to legislative correction was the admission of oral evidence in Mitchell
v. Mitchell 2 to prove a promise to name as beneficiary a party other
than the one named in the policy. To adequately remedy this situa-
tion, a statute that would apply to executed as well as executory
transactions was required.'3 Though such a statute is a novelty in
New York, its wording and legislative history clearly indicate that
subdivision 9 of Section 31 was intended to cover even executed trans-
actions in order to meet this need.'
4
The statute rendered unenforceable a promise to name a bene-
ficiary, a contract to assign or an assignment of a life insurance policy,
unless in writing.' In Siegel v. Tankleff,'6 Justice Froessel held
that a gift of a policy completed by delivery prior to the enactment
of the statute was valid. He implied, however, that delivery after the
effective date of the statute would not suffice. Subsequently, in
5 See, e.g., cases cited note 3 supra; Young v. Prudential Ins. Co., 131 N.Y.
Supp. 968 (Sup. Ct. 1911).6 Matter of Van Alstyne, 207 N.Y. 298, 100 N.E. 802 (1913) ; Jackson v.
Twenty-third Street Ry., 88 N.Y. 521 (1882).
7 See Ward v. New York Life Ins. Co., 225 N.Y. 314, 122 N.E. 207 (1919).
8 Ibid.
9 Katzman v. 2Etna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d 307 (1955)
(dissenting opinion).
10 Ibid. For a discussion of this problem in an analogous situation, see
Hamlin v. Stevens, 177 N.Y. 39, 48, 69 N.E. 118, 120-21 (1903).
11 See, e.g., Ward v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 7; Considine v.
Considine, 255 App. Div. 876, 7 N.Y.S.2d 834 (2d Dep't 1938).
12265 App. Div. 27, 37 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd mer., 290
N.Y. 779, 50 N.E.2d 106 (1943).
13 See Brief for the New York State Ass'n of Life Underwriters as Amicus
Curiae, p. 15, Katzman v. 2Etna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d 307
(1955); Superintendent of Insurance's Memorandum to Governor concerning
Assembly Int. No. 473, Prt. 486, p. 1 (1943) (The New York State Ass'n
of Life Underwriters sponsored the statute and its counsel drafted the measure.
The Superintendent of Insurance submitted the memorandum in support of the
bill.).
14 Ibid. See note 2 supra.
15 See note 2 supra.
16 95 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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McNamee v. Griffin,'7 delivery was held ineffective to remove an
assignment from the operation of the statute. In the instant case the
Appellate Division 18 was of the same view, Justice Cohn dissenting.
Justice Cohn proposed that a constructive trust be imposed upon
the policy in the hands of the defendant. The constructive trust is
an equitable remedy designed to prevent unjust enrichment.' 9 The
number of situations giving rise to such a trust are virtually limitless.
20
A wrongdoer can be made a trustee of property acquired by fraud,
duress, undue influence, violation of an express trust, or other
wrong.2 1  Moreover, the statute of frauds will not inhibit the im-
position of a constructive trust in the face of clear and convincing
evidence of wrongdoing.2 2 When a confidential relationship has been
breached, a constructive trust has even been applied to conveyances
of land.23  The doctrine will also be utilized to prevent unjust enrich-
ment from the proceeds of an insurance policy fraudulently procured.
2 4
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals invoked a constructive
trust to correct the asserted wrong. The plaintiff alleged a confiden-
tial relationship, conspiracy, payment of premiums with her own
money, oral assignment and delivery to her as the named beneficiary.
Upon a motion to dismiss, all material allegations of fact are deemed
to be true.25 Although the statute renders an oral assignment un-
enforceable, the Court held that it is no defense to a party who has
fraudulently obtained a policy from an oral assignee. The rationale,
however, is not entirely clear from the opinion. The Court did not
expressly apply a constructive trust. Moreover, the opinion places
much emphasis on the delivery of the policy. This emphasis, com-
17285 App. Div. 886, 137 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1st Dep't 1955) (per curiam).
18 See Katzman v. Etna Life Ins. Co., 285 App. Div. 446, 137 N.Y.S.2d 583
(1st Dep't 1955).
19 See 3 ScoT, TRUSTS 2312 (1939) ; RESTATEmENT, REsTITuTioN § 1 (1937).
20 "Since a constructive trust is merely 'the formula through which the
conscience of equity finds expression' . . . its applicability is limited only by
the inventiveness of men who find new ways to enrich themselves unjustly...."
Latham v. Father Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 27, 85 N.E.2d 168, 170 (1949). See
3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (1946).
21 See BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 79, 80, 86 (3d ed. 1952); 3 ScoTr, TRUSTS 2327
(1939).
22 See BOGERT, TRUSTS § 78 (3d ed. 1952) ; 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 226 (7th ed. 1929). The theory is not that the trust acts directly upon the
instrument if any, but that it acts upon the property itself as soon as the
wrongdoer is entitled to it, raising a trust in favor of the rightful owner to
defeat the fraud. See Latham v. Father Divine, supra note 20 at 30, 85 N.E.2d
at 172.
23 See, e.g., Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N.Y. 237, 167 N.E. 428 (1929);
Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245, 139 N.E. 255 (1923); Hartkopf v. Hesse, 49
N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
24 See 3 Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 490, 490.1, 490.2 (1939) ; RESTATEMENT, RESTITU-
TIO.N § 185 (1937).




bined with a notable lack of a definite conclusion, could lead to an
interpretation that the case holds delivery removes an oral assignment
from the operation of the statute. Such a proposition, however, would
contravene the letter and purpose of the law,2 6 and ignore the factual
foundation for the instant decision. The Court was fully cognizant
of the statutory intendment,2 and to infer a holding which manifestly
defeats this purpose would do a grave injustice to a court of the
highest reputation.
The principal decision accomplishes substantial justice, but it
does expose the statute to the danger of serious inroads. The case
should be strictly limited and freely distinguished, in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence of fraud, lest the statute be repealed
by judicial fiat.
X
NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT-SECRETARY OF STATE
NOT BOUND TO EFFECT RELEASE OF FOREIGN-JAILED AMERICAN
SolUiER.-Relator petitioned for release of her soldier-husband from
a French jail, alleging violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Pursuant to treaty,1 the American soldier had been
sentenced by a French court upon a plea of guilty to a robbery charge.
The Court of Appeals held that under the treaty the Secretary of State
had no duty to negotiate for his freedom. United States ex rel. Keefe
v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct.
440 (1955).
Every citizen who enters the military is deprived of some con-
stitutional protections previously enjoyed. Indictment by grand jury
is a right expressly withheld from members of the armed forces by
the Constitution.2 Historically, other rights, such as trial by jury in
military tribunals, have been judicially denied. 3 This is partially ex-
26 See Brief for the New York State Ass'n of Life Underwriters as Amicus
Curiae, pp. 5, 6, 15, Katzman v. .Etna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d
307 (1955) ; Superintendent of Insurance's Memorandum to Governor concerning
Assembly Int. No. 473, Prt. 486, p. 1 (1943).
27 See Brief for the New York State Ass'n of Life Underwriters, supra
note 26.
1 The treaty entitled "Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces" is found in 99 CONG. REC.
9024-29 (daily ed. July 14, 1953). This agreement, which regulates duties and
immunities of troops of one member country stationed within another, is here-
inafter referred to as "SOFA" in the interest of brevity.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942) (dictum); United States ex rel.
Innes v. Crystal, 131 F.2d 576, 577 n.2 (2d Cir. 1943) (dictum); see Note,
17 ST. JoHx's L. REv. 29 (1942).
1955 ]
